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Encounters and entanglements are at the core of global historians’ work at three levels. 
Firstly, unlike specialists of regional or national histories, global historians are 
dependent on collaborative investigations that bring together scholars from different 
fields, who are likely to have different regional and linguistic skills, often coming from 
different academic traditions. This requires organizing communication in a way that 
overcomes historical power cleavages between regions, or at the very least refuses to 
reinforce them. Secondly, encounters and entanglements are at the core of the 
problems that interest global historians and which they endeavor to understand and 
endow with meaning, whether explicitly or implicitly through the analytical concepts 
and categories they use. If goods and ideas move and actors encounter one another, 
this raises the question of how such entities communicate across linguistic and regional 
differences. Thirdly, therefore, global historians need to attend to the ways in which 
historical actors simultaneously provide the raw material of encounters and related 
communication—and furnish their own interpretation, which structures the 
encounter. All three levels come together in the writing of global history. In this article 
we aim to show how historical actors referred to an earlier textual tradition, and thereby 
interpreted and created possibilities for transcultural political communication. We 
argue that these strategies and interpretations form part of the historical encounter, 
and need to be acknowledged by historians in order to understand how 
communication works. 
How is this approach related to present debates in global history, and 
contributing to them? Global history writing has been a self-reflexive endeavor from 
its inception; historians have been well aware of the influence of their own life 
experiences on the way they have sought to transcend national boundaries in their 
research. Right from the beginning, global historians have been engaged in writing the 
history of their own discipline. They traced their genealogy to the foundational texts 
of Marc Bloch, who underlined the value of a comparative approach both in order to 
test causalities and to allow for the defamiliarization of known facts and 
developments.1 While the first aspect led to large sociological projects that sought to 
trace universal historical laws—relating, for instance, economic development and 
revolutions—the second was at the origin of the wave of comparative historical studies 
from 1970s onwards, which researched two or more cases with the aim of highlighting 
                                                 
1 MARC BLOCH, “Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes,” Revue de synthèse historique 46, 
20 Nouvelle Série (1928): 15-50. 
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similarities and differences and thus allowing for a more sophisticated gaze at each of 
them. Although it broadened the horizon of the historians beyond their own country, 
comparative approach hardly challenged the traditional predominance of the national 
state as the basic entity for history writing. Comparison was a historiographic 
endeavor, which permitted new interpretations of the past, but which did not claim 
the existence of interdependencies at the historical level.  
In the long run, however, it was the practice of comparative history writing 
which brought out the degree to which nations did and do not exist in isolation from 
each other. Much of the theoretical and methodological groundwork for the history of 
transfers  has been developed with reference to the interactions between France and 
Germany, but has rapidly been taken up for other regions as well.2 Movements and 
transfers of goods, ideas, and people across borders were not exceptional instances, 
but stood at the origin of many developments which had hitherto been interpreted in 
a national context. If this approach undermined the idea of the nation as the most 
important analytical frame, the nation still preceded the transfers, chronologically as 
well as ontologically. In a different historiographical tradition, much of the older 
colonial history, too, has been written as a history of (unilateral) transfer. 
This idea was challenged from two sides. The sophisticated methodology of 
histoire croisée pointed out that transfers were not an add-on, but constitutive for the 
process of nation building itself. This approach combines attention to the crossovers 
that occurred between countries in the past—between their historiographic and 
archival traditions, which prefigured the way present-day historians can approach this 
past—and the crossing of the gaze of these historians, who approach their subject 
from their respective geographical and intellectual locations.3 Such a methodology 
works best when limited to two, or at most three entities, without too much of a power 
difference between them.  
Entangled history, on the other hand, has been developed for the analysis of 
colonial history. Again, the central endeavor has been to overcome a history of 
transfers (in which each transfer had a clear beginning and an end, and proceeded only 
in one direction at a time) and to replace it with attention to the many multidirectional 
and entangled transfers, which were central for the constitution of the colonies and of 
the colonizing societies. Developments were not initiated in Europe and then diffused 
to the rest of the world, but co-created—a co-creation which could only be shown 
through a common frame of reference. European history cannot be understood by 
looking only at European nations and the transfers between them. This claim does not 
rest on the assumption that the impacts of these entanglements need to be equally 
                                                 
2 MICHEL ESPAGNE and MICHAEL WERNER, eds, Transferts: Les relations interculturelles dans l’espace franco-
allemand (XVIIIe et XIXe siècle) (Paris: Édition recherches sur les civilisations, 1988).  
3 MICHAEL WERNER and BÉNÉDICTE ZIMMERMANN, “Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of 
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intense for all the actors involved. Power certainly played a crucial role, but the 
questions of who influenced whom, in which fields, to which degree and with which 
effects can only be answered empirically once colonies and colonizers are no longer 
analyzed in isolation.4 
Many of these reflections were developed for the nineteenth century and (with 
the exception of the history of entanglement) for a Western European context. 
Scholars of Mediterranean history were aware of the problems of transcultural 
encounters already before the current drive towards global history. Concepts like 
cultural hybridity aided the development of a sensibility towards the questions of 
intercultural transfer and the meanings with which the authors endowed these 
encounters. Simultaneously, this led to diversification in the academic use of analytical 
concepts and heuristic devices, a process fostered by the diffusion of global history 
into multiple academic language contexts.5 Nonetheless, this has not yet led to the 
displacement of terminology generally regarded as problematic but nevertheless 
omnipresent—terminology such as ‘East and West’, or ‘Europe and Islam.’6 The 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Mediterranean region was a melting pot, 
and, simultaneously, continuously referred beyond itself: heterogeneity and 
entanglement need to be considered together. Both are premised upon points of 
reference common to the actors involved in the encounters.7 Shared references can 
involve different temporalities—traditions can be lost, discovered, and rediscovered, 
and these processes need not happen at the same time everywhere.8 
A look at Ottoman history exemplifies these points. The mobility of actors and 
the exchanges on the social and cultural level have long been acknowledged,9 as has 
the position of the Ottoman Empire as both situated in the Mediterranean and beyond 
                                                 
4 FREDERIK COOPER and ANN LAURA STOLER, eds, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois 
World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
5 GEORG CHRIST et al., Transkulturelle Verflechtungen: Mediävistische Perspektiven. Kollaborativ verfasst von 
Netzwerk Transkulturelle Verflechtungen (Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2016). 
6 PALMIRA BRUMMET‚ “The Lepanto Paradigm Revisited: Knowing the Ottomans in the Sixteenth 
Century,” in The Renaissance and the Ottoman World, ed. by ANNE CONTADINI and CLAIRE NORTON 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), 63-96. 
7 WOLFRAM DREWS and CHRISTIAN SCHOLL, eds, Transkulturelle Verflechtungsprozesse in der Vormoderne 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016); ANTJE FLÜCHTER and JIVANTA SCHÖTTLI, eds, The Dynamics of 
Transculturality: Concepts and Institutions in Motion (Cham: Springer, 2015); see also the new DFG priority 
program‚ “Transottomanica”, accessed 15 May 2017, https://www.uni-giessen.de/fbz/fb04/ 
institute/geschichte/osteuropa/forschung_neu/Transottomanica. 
8 For this argument in the context of art history see SYLVIA AULD, “Exploring Links Between East and 
West in the 13th Century: Circles of Coincidence,” in Islamic Artefacts in the Mediterranean World Trade: 
Gift Exchange and Artistic Transfer, ed. by CATARINA SCHMIDT ARCANGELI and GERHARD WOLF (Venice: 
Marsilio, 2010), 131-146. 
9 DANIEL GOFFMAN, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); ERIC R. DURSTELER, “On Bazaars and Battlefields: Recent Scholarship on Mediterranean 
Cultural Contacts,” Journal of Early Modern History 15, 5 (2011): 413-434. 
MARGRIT PERNAU & LUC WODZICKI 
   
 
Cromohs 21/2017-2018 - p. 4 
 
it.10 Studies have focused on the question how Ottoman and Italian actors made sense 
of one another on an intellectual level,11 and how these processes were embedded in 
political strategies.12 Taking up Claire Norton’s suggestion that the prevalence of 
shared cultural references in early modern representational culture called for a new 
analytic framework,13 we submit that this overlapping of references was, at least 
partially, the result of a dynamic process drawing on resources that were common to 
both sides. To show how this process can be conceptualized is the central aim of our 
article.  
In the following we suggest two arguments. First, a common frame of reference 
is needed for those historians who aim to trace entanglements. Yet, as suggested above, 
such historians are not the first to engage in this attempt: before them the historical 
actors already strove to communicate within the space of entangled history, and 
created means to do so. Rather than assuming the success of this communication to 
be a matter of course, the actors’ creation of a frame of reference needs to be 
investigated. Second, Reinhart Koselleck’s concept of temporal layers allows us to trace 
one (but not the only) communicative strategy that the actors used—namely their 
recourse to an earlier common history, or, more often, to historical references they 
shared or claimed to share. These arguments will be elaborated through two examples 
of exchanges that used the discussion of virtues in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The 
first example has as its context the relation between the early Ottoman Empire and 
the Italian city states in the fifteenth century; the second has as its context the relation 






                                                 
10 KAREN BARKEY, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); COLIN IMBER, “Ideals and Legitimation in Early Ottoman History,” in Suleyman 
the Magnificent and His Age, ed. by METIN KUNT and CHRISTINE WOODHEAD (London: Routledge, 1997), 
138-154.  
11 NANCY BISAHA, Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); MARGARET MESERVE, Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical 
Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
12 GÜLRÜ NECIPOĞLU, “Visual Cosmopolitanism and Creative Translation: Artistic Conversations with 
Renaissance Italy in Mehmed II’s Constantinople,” Muqarnas 29, 1 (2012): 1-81. 
13 CLAIRE NORTON, “Blurring the Boundaries: Intellectual and Cultural Interactions between the 
Eastern and Western; Christian and Muslim Worlds,” in The Renaissance and the Ottoman World, ed. by 
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The Creation of a Communicative Space14 
Entangled history creates a common frame of reference for the interpretation of the 
past. This common frame is an interpretive device. However, it is not created ex nihilo 
by historians, but draws on entanglements that already took place in history and which 
cannot omitted at will from historical analyses. What has been underplayed so far is 
the question of how entanglement across societies and cultures becomes possible at 
all. This question gains relevance through cultural history’s interest in the meaning that 
actors bring to their actions, a meaning which is not given, but socially created and 
transmitted.  
Entanglements, we suggest, are brought into existence by everyday actions, 
which are repeated over a certain time and follow specific regularities. These actions 
are essentially communicative in nature—they are not random, but goal-oriented and 
endowed with meaning. Movements of actors, ideas, and goods create a need for 
communication; in turn, communication is a basic precondition for these movements. 
They are different from interactions within a society because the actors are not socialized 
into the shared meanings and interpretation of the actions right from the beginning, 
but must develop or create them, either implicitly through their actions, or as a result 
of conscious strategic thinking.  
This concept of communication involves more than the scope encompassed in 
the narrow definition of the term as ‘the successful transmission of information.’ 
Actions are endowed with meaning by the different actors involved in the 
transaction—the problem is how actors, while pursuing their interests, develop a 
common horizon of interpretation (or a range of overlapping horizons), which allows 
them to correctly read the meaning of each other’s actions, and to anticipate future 
moves.15 This development can be intentional, involving anything from the 
employment of translators, to making an effort to learn about the others’ manners and 
customs. In most cases, however, it will constitute a constant modification of previous 
knowledge and assumptions (the pre-mediation that actors bring into an encounter, 
and which shapes the form of the encounter) through the ongoing integration of new 
experiences.16 Historians tend to privilege communication through language, and, so 
                                                 
14 For the concept of communicative space see the summary of the work of the Bielefeld research 
cluster: WILLIBALD STEINMETZ and HEINZ-GERHARD HAUPT, “The Political as a Communicative 
Space in History: The Bielefeld Approach,” in Writing Political History Today, ed. by WILLIBALD 
STEINMETZ, INGRID GILCHER-HOLTEY, and HEINZ-GERHARD HAUPT (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 
2013), 1-11; TOBIAS WEIDNER, Die Geschichte des Politischen in der Diskussion (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012). 
15 Here the history of concepts and temporalities draws on the phenomenological tradition, notably the 
works of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
16 Inspired by Paul Ricœur’s concepts of pre-figuration and re-figuration (PAUL RICŒUR, Time and 
Narrative, 3 vols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984)), the concepts of pre-mediation and re-
mediation are prominent in ASTRID ERLL, Prämediation – Remediation: Repräsentationen des indischen 
Aufstands in imperialen und post-kolonialen Medienkulturen (von 1857 bis zur Gegenwart) (Trier: 
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2007). For the interpretation of face-to-face encounters see PHILIPP 
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far, studies in entangled history have been no exception. It makes sense, however, to 
explore the possibilities for integrating other sign systems and other media into analysis 
of how groups of actors develop a shared horizon and interpret one another’s 
meanings.17  
The development and diffusion of colonial knowledge, which has held such a 
prominent place in historical analysis of the last decades,18 can be viewed as part of this 
creation of a communicative space. In a Foucauldian tradition, this exploration 
emphasizes the relation between knowledge and the exercise of power. However, it 
tends to revert to a model in which all agency is concentrated in the hands of the 
colonials.19 Our emphasis on communication, we suggest, takes up the emphasis on 
power. Power is crucial in contestations of meaning and in the enforcement of one 
interpretation over another. Yet even a very unequal dialogue includes more than one 
voice. The second voice might not always speak back directly and in the same social 
space, but at times it will provide its own interpretation of the encounter at different 
venues and in a different language; hence discovering the second voice might involve 
different historiographical tools. Moreover, a common horizon of interpretation does 
not necessarily imply agreement. A correct reading of the meaning that an actor 
pursues through his or her action does not necessarily lead to consent to the action 
itself, nor does it prevent the interpreter from continuing to assign a different meaning 
to the same action. Therefore, the merging of horizons of meaning is both necessary 
for the development of a communicative space in which entanglements can take place 
in a regular manner, and always contentious—fraught with tensions and incomplete. 
Communication involves misunderstanding, whether productive or less so; 




                                                 
NIELSEN, BENNO GAMMERL, and MARGRIT PERNAU, eds, Encounters with Emotions (forthcoming), with 
further references. 
17 The history of concepts, which traditionally was focused on language in order to understand political 
and social concepts, is currently expanding its scope of interest. This concerns not only the investigation 
of new categories of concepts, for instance referring to aesthetics or to natural sciences, but also 
concepts in non-verbal sign systems (for details see MARGRIT PERNAU and IMKE RAJAMANI, 
“Emotional Translations: Conceptual History Beyond Language,” History & Theory 55, 1 (2016): 46-65. 
The possibility of moving even further by opening up the dialogue with anthropology and with other 
disciplines bringing the body into the picture is currently being debated and will hopefully lead to 
publications in the near future. 
18 BERNARD COHN, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996). 
19 GAURI VISWANATHAN, Mask of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989). 
20 ANTONY PAGDEN, European Encounters with the New World: From Renaissance to Romanticism (New Haven: 
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Entanglements and Temporal Layers 
Koselleck’s theoretical reflections on history are currently gaining new international 
attention; he pointed out that every present was coexistent with layers from different 
pasts.21 The resources that historical actors needed so as to endow their experiences 
and actions with meaning were never drawn only from the present—be it their 
language and its concepts, which already prefigured certain interpretations and which 
could not be invented, or even profoundly re-semantized at the spur of a moment; be 
it the multitude of texts from different centuries, which embodied past experiences 
and their interpretation. These texts could be read as historical documents. More often, 
however, their historicity would be forgotten (or lack interest for the reader) and they 
were deemed to speak directly to the present. This certainly holds true for canonical 
religious texts—in most cases the Bible or the Quran has been read for what it tells 
not about the time in which it was written down, but about the interpretation and 
guidance it can provide for the present. The same is also possible for philosophical 
texts and, of course, literature, to which actors can refer or from which they have been 
habituated to draw their orientation for the present. Again, this response need not be 
restricted to texts, but works also for other sign systems like art and music.  
Like geological layers, temporal layers can be the result of a process of 
sedimentation: layers that were once at the surface are overlaid with new layers, and 
slowly move downward, without disappearing. The present therefore coexists with 
many pasts; this is one of the meanings for which Koselleck used the concept of the 
contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous.22 (The second meaning, referring not 
to an image of sedimentation but to one of tectonic plates, is omitted in the present 
article). 
Two questions need to be addressed in order to use this figure for investigating 
the creation of a communicative space for entanglement in more detail. First: how 
precisely does the drawing on past resources happen? Jacques Derrida discursively 
developed the figure of the palimpsest—a manuscript that has been erased and 
overwritten, but still shows traces of the former text—and Sara Ahmed has used this 
                                                 
21 For an excellent introduction see NIKLAS OLSEN, History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of 
Reinhart Koselleck (New York: Berghahn, 2012); REINHART KOSELLECK, Zeitschichten (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2003); specially the chapters: “Über die Theoriebedürftigkeit der Geschichtswissenschaft,” 
298-316 (English translation: REINHART KOSELLECK, “On the Need of Theory in the Discipline of 
History,” in The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), 1-20) and “Stetigkeit und Wandel aller Zeitgeschichten,” 246-265. For recent interventions 
see JAVIER FERNÁNDEZ SEBASTIÁN, ed., Political Concepts and Time. New Approaches to Conceptual History 
(Santander: Cantabria University Press, 2011); HELGE JORDHEIM et al., “Forum: Multiple 
Temporalities,” History & Theory 53, 4 (2014): 498-591. 
22 REINHART KOSELLECK, “Zeitschichten,” in Zeitschichten, 19-27; WOLF SCHÄFER, Ungleichzeitigkeit als 
Ideologie: Beitra ̈ge zur historischen Aufkla ̈rung (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verl., 1994); ELKE UHL, 
“Gebrochene Zeit? Ungleichzeitigkeit als geschichtsphilosophisches Problem,” in Geschichtsphilosophie 
und Kulturkritik: Historische und systematische Studien, ed. by JOHANNES ROHBECK and HERTA NAGL-
DOCEKAL (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003), 50-74. 
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figure to show how past hurts continue to mark the present without requiring active 
recalling or conscious memory.23 Indeed, thinking along the figure of the palimpsest 
suggests that deeper layers continue to mark the present. This would mean that texts, 
for instance, continue to exert an influence on present creations of meaning even if no 
one reads them, or even if no one knows of their existence, because they influenced 
texts which in turn influenced texts, and so on, until we finally arrive at texts which are 
still being read. Thus a particular concept acquires a layer of meaning, and one that 
actors need no longer be aware of. Alternatively, the texts at some time created an 
effect in the world which is part of the world as it exists in the present. For instance, 
certain Neoplatonic debates strongly influenced the way the Greek desert monks 
thought about virtues and vices. This, in turn, was a formative influence on the concept 
of the seven deadly sins, which still, it might be argued, shapes some present-day 
debates. Such influence should not be discarded at a theoretical level. In practice it will 
be so diluted that it will not always prove worthwhile to trace the chain of influences 
through the centuries.  
This idea of the palimpsest makes it possible to consider earlier texts as actors 
in their own right that no longer need human agency to produce effects. More 
important for the problems we are discussing here, however, is the excavation of 
former layers (to continue in the geological metaphor). Here, too, the past is seen as 
always co-present, but as a potentiality, which needs activation in order to exert an 
influence. As long as an old book is kept in a library somewhere, even if no one is 
reading it or is even able to understand its language, this old book can still be brought 
to the surface: it can be re-discovered, re-published, and become a shared resource for 
the interpretation of present experiences. Likewise, a language can be learned, a script 
deciphered. Without this actualization in the present, however, the influence of the 
book or the language will be negligible, as will the degree of its presence in the present. 
To recognize this already significantly reduces the material to be taken into 
consideration: it is the not the entire past, but the past that the historical actors are 
actually using, and the interpretation they are giving to it. Contrasting this ‘actualized’ 
past to the interpretation the original authors intended might be useful if the historicity 
of interpretation needs underlining; it does not add to the meaning the texts had in the 
horizon of the presence of the historical actors. As such, if we wish to trace the 
influence of an Aristotelian ethics of virtue on debates between Italians and Ottomans 
in the fifteenth century, what matters is how they understood Aristotle, rather than the 
message Aristotle had originally wanted to convey. 
The second question refers more directly to entanglements. The metaphor of 
the temporal layers was devised within the imaginary of a stable and contained 
geographical unity: the present is supposed to happen in the same space as the past, 
                                                 
23 JACQUES DERRIDA, Dissemination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); SARA AHMED, The 
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and it is ‘their own’ sedimentations that people continue to refer to or excavate. 
However, even in traditional historiography, this seems more an exception than the 
rule. The history of Germany or Britain regularly begins in Greece and Asia Minor for 
that matter (or even in Egypt); the history of Muslims in very different parts of the 
world is written from a common starting point in Medina; Latin American history 
posits (or posited) its origin in the Iberian Peninsula. Such narratives can reflect actual 
migrations (mostly of a numerically small but powerful section of the population). 
More often these pasts are claimed as part of the historical inheritance without actual 
continuities. In turn, voicing these claims can be a conscious strategy, based on 
appreciating that the resources of the past can be used for in the present. Yet this is 
not a necessary condition: often the link of the past to the present—and the possibility 
to refer back to that past—will be perceived as naturally and unquestionably given. 
The excavation of temporal layers, therefore, can happen in a frame much 
broader than that suggested by ‘the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous.’ 
Specifically, geographical spaces as well as temporal spaces are integrated and brought 
into co-presence. The fact that experiences, their interpretations, and the creation of 
meaning in a more abstract context, have been committed to media preserves them; 
further (but not suggested by the figure of the palimpsest), the same fact allows us to 
account for their transportation from one place and one society to another. 
Excavations and the reclaiming of past layers happen not only at the location at which 
the actor is standing in the present, but can involve traveling, both actual and mental. 
Temporal layers challenge the temporal coherence of any one period across space. Yet 
such a challenge leads to a denial of contemporaneity once difference is organized 
along a uniform timeline, on which certain phenomena correspond to a universal 
definition of ‘stone age,’ others to an equally universal ‘middle age’ or ‘early modernity.’ 
Although such temporalization has been the hegemonic interpretation of difference 
since the Enlightenment, maintaining it is unnecessary—there can be difference 
without the idea that it implies a lagging behind or an avant-garde. 
The possibility of accessing past temporal layers at different places also implies 
that the same heritage can be activated and claimed as part of one’s own by more than 
one actor. Thus even societies that lack a shared history of previous encounter can 
share a common horizon of meaning by referring back to and claiming as their own 
texts, or other media, from a past temporal layer. This claim can be brought about 
through the encounter as an intentional strategy through which to create or enlarge 
possibilities for communication; it can also already have a long history of being 
considered a canonical reference in one or both of the societies. In this case, again, the 
claim can lead to an explicit recognition that a specific heritage is shared, or the role of 
this heritage can be downplayed in favor of a more or less explicit universalism. 
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The Multiple Layers of Reading Aristotle’s Ethics 
We are not interested in the meanings given to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics in its 
time and place, nor are we proposing (yet another) history of the reception of 
Aristotle’s work over the last two millennia. Rather, we aim to offer a first glimpse of 
how the re-reading of the text at different moments and in different places drew on 
different layers of interpretation, and added to these layers. These newer layers, in turn, 
constituted a potentiality from which actors at different places could draw, irrespective 
of whether the text ‘belonged’ to their history. Layers of entanglement could be 
constituted by past entanglements; they could also be created in the historical actors’ 
present by referencing and appropriating different pasts. These entanglements 
constituted an important resource (but certainly not the only resource—there were 
other texts and other strategies) for the creation of a shared horizon of meaning in 
later encounters.  
As is well known, the epoch of the Abbasid Empire was pivotal for the 
translation and reception of Greek knowledge—philosophy, medicine, mathematics, 
and astronomy—into Arabic. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics was first adapted into 
Arabic by Ibn Miskawayh (932-1030 CE),24 and then rewritten in Persian by Nasir ud 
Din Tusi (1201-1274 CE).25 The Akhlaq-e Nasiri formed the model for many of the 
medieval and early modern texts written about ethics, both in Persia and in India. 
These texts have rightly been read as treatises of political philosophy.26 However, the 
title of Miskawayh’s translation, Tahzib ul Akhlaq, or ‘the polishing of the 
habitus/disposition’ (khulq, pl. akhlaq), already pointed to an understanding of politics 
which was deeply grounded in the creation of a particular ethical self, in which virtues 
and emotions converge.27 Many of the akhlaq treatises followed a tripartite structure, 
dealing with the nafs, or the soul (corresponding to the Greek psyche) in the first part; 
the manzil, or the household (the Greek oikos) in the second; and finally with the madina, 
or the polity (the Greek polis) in the third. Thus the polity was based on an ethical male 
subject, who was at the head of his household and managed it competently. This 
qualified him to take part in ‘political’ activities in the narrower sense. At the same 
time, the Arabic and even more the Persian translation also adapted the text from this 
                                                 
24 IBN MISKAWAYH, The Refinement of Character, trans. by CONSTANTINE K. ZURAYK (Chicago: Kazi 
Publications, 2003). 
25 NASIR UD DIN TUSI, Akhlaq-e Nasiri (Lucknow: Naval Kishore, 1891); translated by G. M. Wickens 
as, The Nasirean Ethics, UNESCO Collection of Representative Works, Persian Series (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1964); HAMID DABASHI, “Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi: The Philosopher/Vizier and The 
Intellectual Climate of His Times,” in History of Islamic Philosophy, ed. by OLIVER LEAMAN and SEYYED 
HOSSEIN NASR (London: Routledge, 1994), 1:527-584. 
26 For a detailed analysis on medieval and early modern akhlaq literature in India see MUZAFFAR ALAM, 
The Languages of Political Islam: India 1200-1800 (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004). 
27 The locus classicus for the relation between the care of the self and the development of ethics is of 
course MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Care of the Self, vol. 3 of The History of Sexuality (London: Penguin Books, 
1986); FOUCAULT, The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the College de France, 1981-82 (New York: 
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earlier participatory context to a monarchical setting. Here the text provided guidelines 
for the virtuous ruler and therby contributed to the legitimation of his rule. Both 
interpretations continued to exist side by side, and could be drawn upon at different 
occasions. 
Medieval Western scholasticism could draw on a broad range of translations, 
transmissions, and traditions of reading Aristotle, many of them originating from 
Sicily—only recently Christianized—and from culturally heterogeneous Spain.28 
Equally important were translations as well as commentaries produced in 
Constantinople, from where Thomas Aquinas eventually received them.29 Aquinas 
among others played an important role for the integration of Aristotelian ethics of 
virtue-emotions as a central paradigm in Western European Ethics.30  
In early fifteenth-century Italy, Aristotelianism was taught through scholastic 
commentaries and was accessible only through translations of minor quality. 
Aristotelian ethics was ubiquitous, but increasingly came to be criticized as doctrinal.31 
Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs led the Florentine humanist Leonardo Bruni 
(1370-1444) to engage in a thoughtful retranslation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
from Greek into Latin, bringing the work back into focus for humanist moral 
discussion and political thought.32 Instead of approaching Aristotelian virtue ethics in 
terms of a static Greek philosophical model, humanists such as Giovanni 
Pontano (1426-1503), began seeking to discover the practical relevance of such ethics 
for their own times. This ‘new’ Aristotle then became accessible at universities, but 
also at courts, the houses of the nobility, and in merchant cities. And while notions 
such as ‘virtue’ remained contested, they ‘shaped political, social, and intellectual 
practices, while they were themselves strongly affected by these same practices.’33  
                                                 
28 CHARLES BURNETT, “Arabic into Latin: the Reception of Arabic Philosophy into Western Europe,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. by PETER ADAMSON and RICHARD C. TAYLOR 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 370-404; DAG N. HASSE, “The Social Conditions of 
the Arabic-(Hebrew-)Latin Translation Movements in Medieval Spain and in the Renaissance,” in Wissen 
über Grenzen: Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter, ed. by ANDREAS SPEER and LYDIA WEGENER 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006), 68-88. 
29 PETER FRANKOPAN‚ “The Literary, Cultural and Political Context for the Twelfth-Century 
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics,” in Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, ed. 
by CHARLES BARBER and DAVID JENKINS (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 101-145. 
30 SIGRID MÜLLER, “From Virtue Ethics to Normative Ethics? Tracing Paradigm Shifts in Fifteenth-
Century Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics,” in Between Creativity and Norm-Making, ed. by 
SIGRID MÜLLER and CORNELIA SCHWEIGER (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 9-30. 
31 JAMES HANKINS, “The Ethics Controversy,” in Humanism and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance, vol.1 
(Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2003), 193-239. 
32 The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni. Selected Texts, trans. and ed. by DAVID THOMPSON, GORDON 
GRIFFITHS and JAMES HANKINS (Binghamton: The Renaissance Society of America, 1987). 
33 MATTHIAS ROICK, Pontano’s Virtues: Aristotelian Moral and Political Thought in the Renaissance (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2017), 121; see also: JAMES HANKINS, “The Virtue Politics of Italian Humanists,” in Beyond 
Reception: Renaissance Humanism and the Transformation of Classical Antiquity, ed. by PATRICK BAKER, 
JOHANNES HELMRATH, and CRAIG KALLENDORF (forthcoming), available via: 
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Aristotle in Political Communication between the Italian Courts and 
Mehmet II 
After Mehmet II had conquered Constantinople in 1453, he created an imperial 
household that would resemble the heterogeneous nature of his emerging empire. 
Ottoman rule had always been marked by the ability to function as a central hub, 
creating transcultural dependencies through permeability and mediation.34 Mehmet II’s 
court needs to be understood with reference to Islamicate traditions, within which 
patronage of philosophy and art were crucial.35 So sources for knowledge of Aristotle 
went beyond Ibn Sina and al-Farabi—a discussion of the virtue ethics took place 
through Ahmed Amasi, who translated Tusi and al-Ghazzali as early as 1406.36 But the 
court must also be understood in terms of a continuous accumulation of cultural layers. 
Newly integrated Greek scholars were not the first to introduce Aristotle, but they 
participated in bringing different traditions together. 
The Fall of Constantinople shook the politically fragmented Italian peninsula, 
but calls for military intervention were soon given up. Some saw the economy in the 
Mediterranean as reliant on Constantinople’s pivotal position; for others the Ottomans 
presented a chance to shift the fragile political balance in their own favor. As a 
consequence, ways of engaging in successful communication needed to be found, a 
process which was as concerned about being heard as it was about being understood. 
These entanglements happened on three levels. 
First, Aristotelian notions of virtue ethics were known to both sides. The same 
four cardinal virtues can be found in fifteenth-century Italian and Ottoman political or 
ethical works: prudence (prudentia/hikmet), courage (fortitudo/şecâ’at), honesty 
(sinceritas/’iffet), and justice (iustitia/’adâlet).37 Tursun Beğ (1420-1499), the chronicler of 
Mehmet II’s rule, introduced his Tarih by including a theory of State and rulership, 
referring to the concept of emotion-virtue derived from Miskawayh and Tusi: to Beğ 
a virtue is achieved when the forces of the self are paired with temper, habit, and 
education, and are subjugated to the human will.38 On the Italian side, Pontano 
                                                 
https://www.academia.edu/30007286/The_Virtue_Politics_of_the_Italian_Humanists (accessed May 
15, 2017). 
34 BARKEY, Empire of Difference. 
35 ANNA AKASOY, “Die Adaptation byzantinischen Wissens am Osmanenhof nach der Eroberung 
Konstantinopels,” in Wissen in der Krise: Institutionen des Wissens im gesellschaftlichen Wandel, ed. by CARSTEN 
KRETSCHMANN et al. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004), 43–56. 
36 MARINOS SARIYANNIS, Ottoman Political Thought up to the Tanzimat: A Concise History (Rethymno: 
Foundation for Research and Technology – Hellas, 2015), 30-32.  
37 MARINOS SARIYANNIS, “The Princely Virtues as Presented in Ottoman Political and Moral 
Literature,” Turcica 43 (2011): 121-144. 
38 TURSUN BEĞ, The History of Mehmed the Conqueror, trans. by HALIL İNALCIK and RHOADS MURPHY 
(Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1978); KENAN INAN, “On the Sources of Tursun Bey’s Tarih-i 
Ebu’l-Feth,” in The Ottoman Empire: Myths, Realities and ‘Black Holes’: Contributions in Honour of Colin Imber, 
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employed the same idea of the tripartite human soul, and virtue as a habit and a median 
while linking these to the notion of the importance of being virtuous and appearing 
virtuous.39 
Second, the actors became increasingly aware of the fact that they shared these 
notions. Already early eyewitnesses arriving from the Ottoman court reported on a 
Sultan who employed teachers (medicos) in Latin and Greek, listened to recitations of 
classic epics, and engaged in philosophical discussions.40 Humanists engaged 
attentively with these reports; the same descriptions also seemed validated by 
accounts—like that of the travelling Greek scholar Georg Amiroutzes—of personal 
conversations with the ruler, who appeared well-versed in Aristotelian thought.41 When 
Amiroutzes’s compatriot George of Trebizond sought employment at the court of 
Mehmet II, the Italians intercepted his letters. They found a description of Mehmet II 
as possessing prudentia and iustitia, together with a treatise on ‘The Difference between 
Plato and Aristotle,’ showing that this was indeed the discursive tradition to which 
discussion of these virtues belonged.42  
Finally, these shared references provided the language for political 
communication. This could happen through the transmission of texts, as was the case 
when the Florentines, choosing an appropriate gift for the Sultan, decided on the 
works of the aforementioned Leonardo Bruni.43 In addition, Aristotelian concepts 
could be used to build political arguments: when Sigismondo Malatesta, Lord of 
Rimini, argued for an alliance with the Sultan, he structured his letter through the 
Aristotelian notions of vita activa and vita contemplativa.44 And such serviceable 
invocations of Aristotle could happen in the visual realm: portrait medals, important 
media of diplomacy, depicted the Sultan embodying virtues—as seen, for instance, on 
a medal linking the image of Mehmet II with Pegasus, the sign for the victory of virtue 
over vice, and the symbol for prudence.45  
 
                                                 
39 ROICK, “Virtue, Inside Out,” part 3 of Pontano’s Virtues, 121-178. 
40 Account of Nikolaos Sekundinos, the text can be found in VIKENTI V. MAKUŠEV, Monumenta Historica 
Slavorum Meridionalium Vicinorumque Populorum, vol.1 (Warsaw: s.n., 1874), 295-306.  
41 ASTERIOS ARGYRIOU and GEORGES LAGARRIGUE‚ “Georges Amiroutzes et son Dialogue sur la Foi au 
Christ tenu avec les Sultan des Turcs,” Byzantinische Forschungen 11 (1987): 29-221. 
42 ANGELO MERCATI, “Le due lettere di Giorgio da Trebisonda a Maometto II,” Orientalia Christiana 
Periodica 9 (1943): 65-99.  
43 BENEDETTO DEI, La cronica dall’anno 1400 all’anno 1500, ed. by ROBERTO BARDUCCI (Florence: 
Francesco Papafava Editore, 1974), fol. 53r. 
44 The letter can be found in transcription in GIOVANNI SORANZO, “Una Missione di Sigismondo 
Pandolfo Malatesta a Maometto II nel 1461-documenti,” La Romagna 6 (1909): 93-95.  
45 The analysis of this hitherto unresearched medal forms part of Luc Wodzicki’s dissertation-in-
progress. The medal can be found in G. F. HILL, A Corpus of the Italian Medals of the Renaissance before 
Cellini, 2 vols (London: British Museum, 1930), no. 1203. Julian Raby suspects the medal to have been 
manufactured at Mehmet’s court. See: JULIAN RABY, “Pride and Prejudice: Mehmed the Conqueror and 
the Italian Portrait Medal,” Studies in the History of Art 21 (1987): 171-194. 
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Aristotle in the Colonial Encounter in India 
Delhi had been one of the most important centers of the Mughal Empire since the 
seventeenth century. After the British had conquered the city and the last emperor in 
1803, they continued to use the Persian language and symbolic universe, while 
attempting to stabilize their power in what was still an undecided struggle with the 
French and the Marathas. By the 1830s, however, a new generation of colonial 
administrators had arrived; they intended to use their new power to effect changes in 
the administration of the country, and in education. Their aim was the creation of a 
new generation of Indians who were familiar with British culture, with its literature as 
well as its values, and who were able to translate these to their compatriots. While in 
Bengal this had led to a harsh cultural policy, aimed at discarding the Indian heritage 
that the British despised, in North India and especially in Delhi, these efforts were 
more dialogical in nature. From 1840 Delhi College became a symbol for this policy—
according to which British knowledge was to be taught, but through the Urdu 
language, and parallel to a continued emphasis on Arabic, Persian, and Sanskrit. 
Teachers and soon also former students engaged in translations, edited journals and 
newspapers, and were at the center of the traditional and the colonial forms of 
sociability. The British strategy paid off: in the Revolt of 1857 the professors and 
students of Delhi College sided with the colonial power, and in the following decades 
they worked in the colonial administration, and took up major educational projects 
that gave an important place to British knowledge.46  
Delhi College has often been hailed as a symbol for a creative cultural encounter, 
yet it was hardly a power-free zone. All of the important decisions—from the 
allocation of funds for the Oriental and English branches to the curricula for both—
were taken by the colonial power. The list of books taught included scientific and 
literary works, those of history, and a broad introduction to Enlightenment 
philosophy: from Thomas Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind and Dugald Stewart’s 
Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, to John Abercrombie’s Inquiries Concerning 
the Intellectual Powers and the Investigation of Truth. Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, too, was 
taught, while his Theory of Moral Sentiments formed part of the program of the 
Translation Society.47 It is notable that Smith drew extensively on the Aristotelian 
tradition, but the same tradition was present in the other texts as well, though often 
unmarked The officers creating the curriculum were less interested in the political 
message of the Enlightenment (the creation of a civil society), and more interested in 
the texts that concerned the workings of the human mind, the emotions, and virtues. 
These matters were central to the creation of a political subject, which, in this context, 
was also a colonial subject. 
                                                 
46 For more detail see MARGRIT PERNAU, ed., The Delhi College: Traditional Elites, the Colonial State and 
Education before 1857 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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The Delhi College makes a fascinating case study for our argument because the 
students who were introduced to this tradition—which was designated as Western 
knowledge—were already familiar with the Persianate tradition starting from Nasir ud 
Din Tusi’s thirteenth-century rendition of the Tahzib ul Akhlaq. This text was widely 
circulated among the North Indian elites, but even those who had not read it had at 
least read more popular versions that drew from it. Since the Mughal period such 
versions had been part of the upbringing of young men of respectable Muslims 
households (and of the Persianized Hindu communities).48 Unlike the Ottoman-Italian 
case from the fifteenth century, in this instance the process of drawing on a common 
reference was not flagged, nor was it part of a strategic move to facilitate 
communication. Both the books of the Delhi College curriculum and the Persian 
ethical literature drew on Aristotle. Yet each referred to markedly different temporal 
and spatial layers of the transmission and interpretation of Aristotle’s work.  
Students may or may not have been aware that the Aristotelian tradition formed 
the common strand between what they were taught at home and at Delhi College. That 
this did not preclude the efficacy of the ideas is shown in the work of Maulawi 
Zakaullah, a prominent alumnus of Delhi College, who worked as a professor, 
translator, and writer after 1857. He produced a monumental history of India in ten 
volumes, and also a massive concordance of philosophic and theological approaches 
to ethical thinking in Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism.49 Zakaullah sought to prove 
that the values promulgated by the colonial power were not alien to Muslims, but 
corresponded with aspects of their own heritage. In Zakaullah’s view, the universality 
of ethical teaching fostered the encounter in which he had enthusiastically participated 
since his student days. This universality was less an invented category, as has been 




As pointed out at the beginning of this article, actors moving in space and involved in 
cross-cultural entanglements are faced with problems of communication. The 
solutions they develop are an important topic for historians who are interested in the 
fact that connections transcending cultural borders existed in the past, and in how and 
why these connections worked. To study these topics implies neither seeing cultures 
                                                 
48 RAJEEV KINRA, Writing Self, Writing Empire. Chandar Bhan Brahman and the Cultural World of the Indo-
Persian State Secretary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015). 
49 MARGRIT PERNAU, “Maulawi Muhammad Zaka Ullah. Reflections of a Muslim Moralist on the 
Compatibility of Islam, Hinduism and Christianity,” in Convictions religieuses et engagement en Asie du Sud 
depuis 1850 (Études Thématiques No. 25), ed. by CATHERINE CLÉMENTIN-OJHA (Paris: École Française 
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as incommensurable and exoticizing their differences,50 nor glossing over the 
differences. Historical actors certainly developed strategies for successful political 
communication (if only because the alternative was too costly), but this involved a 
process drawn out over time, which could be more or less consciously devised.  
The creation of common horizons of meaning through referencing shared 
textual traditions has long been an important strategy of communication. The two 
examples discussed above—of the interactions between Mehmet II and the Italian 
courts, and between North Indian intellectuals and the colonial power—show 
Aristotelian ethics as the shared textual tradition. Using Koselleck’s concept of 
temporal layers, we have identified these references to Aristotle’s thought as belonging 
to earlier strata of meaning, which was part of the intellectual inheritance of all the 
groups, whose political communication we investigated: Aristotle was as important a 
tradition in the Islamicate world as in Europe.  
However, the powerful image of temporal layers, derived from geology, should 
not lead us to ascribe immovability and an unchanging nature to the deeper layers. The 
examples reveal that the meanings of emotions and virtues, and the ways these could 
be applied in everyday ethics, were constantly negotiated and reconfigured. 
Nevertheless, the ethics still preserved a sufficient family resemblance to be 
recognizable across borders, and thus to allow for communication and the possibility 
of understanding. This encompassed not only the selection of emotions and virtues 
relevant to political activity (or, more generally, to activity in the sphere of the polis, the 
civitas or the madina), but also what it meant to be courageous or compassionate, to take 
just two examples. Although not identical, the understandings of these emotion-virtues 
were similar enough to contribute to the creation of shared horizons. (Even so, this 
does not yet say anything about the use that these shared horizons would be put to.) 
Such an approach allows us to bring together the three entanglements 
mentioned in the introduction: entanglement at the level of the historians of different 
regions; entanglement at the level of the actors, and the entanglement between these 
two levels which arises once we take into consideration the actors’ interpretation. The 
concepts and temporalities that historians draw on reflect their own present-day 
questions and positionality, and global historians have achieved a high degree of self-
reflexivity in this respect. But they are not the first to endow political communication 
between actors with meaning—the historical actors themselves have already provided 
multiple interpretations of their own experiences, and these interpretations inform 
their practices, communicative and otherwise. Accordingly global historians are 
involved in a twofold communication process: with one another, across the borders of 
regional studies; with the interpretations of the historical actors (who in turn needed 
to transcend borders of their own in order to communicate). As pointed out by Dipesh 
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Chakrabarty and others following him, the extent to which the experience and 
interpretation of historical actors can enter the present-day debate depends very much 
on past and present power relations: while European experiences easily enter the 
supposedly universal language of present-day social sciences, the same is much more 
difficult, if not impossible, for concepts and languages from other regions of the world. 
Global history needs the provincializing of European concepts and the provincializing 
of entanglements. And this asks that global historian actively engage with historical 
concepts and with interpreting communication by all the actors involved in the 
encounter and entanglement under consideration.51  
                                                 
51 DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, Provincializing Europe (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001); MARGRIT 
PERNAU, “Provincializing Concepts. The Language of Transnational History,” Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 36, 3 (2016): 483-499. 
